An amount of income can be obtained jointly by m agents, the ith agent's share of income being Bi. The income and the utilities of each agent are functions of the state of nature. Each agent has a probability measure over the states of nature. An ejficient proportional distribution is one which is (1) Pareto optimal and for which (2) the expected proportion of income agent i receives divided by Bi is independent of i. It is shown that if the attitudes are strictly concave then there exists exactly one proportional distribution scheme. Furthermore, in special cases, each agent expects to receive an income that exceeds his share.
Introduction
The model presented here deals with a simple economy in which a number of agents desire to distribute an amount of income that depends on an uncertain event. Each agent i is assumed to have a utility function ui(s, c) which depends on income c as well as the state of nature s. Each agent also has a probability distribution pLi, which reflects his expectations. The approach of this paper is to classify the distribution schemes that are efficient (or optimal), those schemes that have the property that no other scheme can provide a higher expected utility to all of the agents, in terms of the expected share of income an agent receives. The main result is that given any positive numbers fIIi (shares) summing to one there is exactly one efficient distribution with the property that O,/fIj is equal to the ratio of the expected proportions of income received by i to that of j. Thus, if xi(s) is the income agent i receives in state s and Z(s) is the total income in state s, we have Sxi(s)dMeiSI(S)d i d p m ependent of i. Such a scheme will be called an efficient (or optimal) proportional distribution corresponding to the shares 1,. . .,d,. When all expectations are the same, proportionality reduces to ~x.(s)d~.=B.~l(s)d~.
for all i. +his rLsu;t provid& a complete classification of the efficient states of the economy. It is well known that the efficient points of an economy whose agents have strictly concave utility functions can be identified with a simplex of appropriate dimension. For example, if a group of workers with known relative abilities and identical jobs are required to distribute the income derived from their combined labor, the shares could correspond to their relative abilities. In this instance, the state of nature could reflect the income of the firm as well as other factors relevant to the workers. There is no reason to expect that the expectations of the workers would be identical in such a situation. If the total income Z is obtained by adding the income Ii of the agents, we may take Bi=Zi/Z. There are two problems with this approach. First, if income depends on the state of nature, ei is not well defined (the expected ratio of Ii to Z will differ from agent to agent). Furthermore, if we derive the shares from individual income, the distribution scheme should be individually rational: if xi(s) is the income distributed to agent i, it must satisfy J ui(s, xi(s)) dpi 2 1 ui(s, Ii) dpi. The efficient proportional distribution corresponding to the shares Z,/Z,. .., Z,jZ need not have this property. Individual rationality is not a consideration if an agent is unable to guarantee his share of the income without the aid of other agents. Thus, in the example concerning distribution of income derived from a production process, the lack of individual rationality will not be a problem if the technology exhibits increasing returns to scale or if, for some reason, workers are unable to generate income on their own.
If there is some recognized procedure for determining the shares, the efficient proportional distribution has some appeal as an equitable outcome of the distribution process. However, no additional properties associated with fairness can be guaranteed.
In particular, even if all shares are equal, there is no reason to believe that an agent will not prefer (in the expected utility sense) the income another receives. Nevertheless, in certain cases another property can be asserted: that agent i's expected percentage of income will exceed his share. If the income is thought of as a cake to be divided among the agents, then this result describes the situations in which it is possible to efficiently divide up the cake so that each agent believes he is receiving more than his share. Dubins and Spanier (1961) prove a similar result when all of the agents have linear utility functions.
In section 7 it is shown that their theorem follows as a special case of the one presented here.
The conclusions of this paper should be compared to several earlier results. Gale and Sobel (1980) presented a model similar to this one. However, agents were assumed to have identical expectations.
It is shown that corresponding to any given shares 8i,. . ., 8, there is a unique efficient distribution with agent i receiving expected share Bi for each i. This follows as a special case of the results presented here. On the other hand, Gale and Sobel proved that the desired allocation can be characterized as the solution to a certain constrained maximization problem. An analogous result has not been found in the more general case presented here, so independent proofs have been provided.
The fact that the distribution problem with different expectations cannot be solved by the maximization of a single function can be put in perspective if the results of Wilson (1968) are considered.
Wilson was interested in a model more general than ours, in which a group chooses a distribution (sharing rule) and an action that will effect a random outcome. In our model, the group has no explicit influence on the outcome. Wilson shows that unless expectations are identical, or the sharing rule is linear, there will be no way to determine an efficient allocation my maximizing a social utility function satisfying the Savage axioms.
The second section of this paper provides a formal description of the model. Section 3 proves existence and section 4 uniqueness of efficient proportional distributions.
In section 5, two special cases are analyzed. In these, each agent expects to receive more than his share in the efficient proportional distribution. Section 6 looks at the special case in which the agents have different expectations, but identical utility functions. In this case, an efficient scheme of 'proportional bets' can be constructed to give positive expected utility to every agent. Finally, section 7 deduces several results of Dubins and Spanier (1961) as special cases of our analysis.
The model
In this section we describe the problem. The characteristics of the model are :
bounded, measurable function I (the total income) defined on a probability space S (the states of nature). real valued utility functions ui defined on S x R, for i= 1,. . ., m. The functions are denoted by u,(s,c) and are assumed to be increasing and concave in c. Letting u! denote differentiation with respect to c, we also assume ui and u; are bounded and measurable in s. probability measures pi representing the expectations of the agents. We assume the measures are mutually absolutely continuous [that is, if pj(A)= 0 for some j then pi(A)=0 for all i] hence the measures can be replaced by bounded measurable functions pi which can be taken to be positive almost everywhere.
The pi are densities (Radon-Nikodym derivatives) with respect to a common measure, say y = m-' CT= 1 pi, and satisfy is f(s) dpi = js f(s)pi(s) dy for all integrable functions J In what follows all integrals will be with respect to the measure y; reference to y is suppressed in our notation.
Also we write jf for jsJ: Finally, the pi are normalized so that j is equal to the expected share of income received by agent i.
That is, Jdi(s)pi(s)=Jdi(s)pi(s)/jZ(s)pi(s).
For each 
Existence of optimal proportional distributions
In this section we will show that efficient proportional distributions exist. The proof is a consequence of the next lemma:
Lemma. Let u be a convex valued upper hemicontinuous correspondence from the (m-1)-dimensional simplex to itseljY If Izi =0 implies vi=0 for all DE CY@), then t( is surjective.
When cx is single-valued this is a consequence of Brouwer's Theorem. In the general case one can construct a proof by using an approximation theorem. For example, the result of Celina given in Hildenbrand and Kirman (1976, app . IV) is sufficient to prove the lemma. 
Notice that if d E $(A) for some 1 then x is efficient. Next define f: 6+ A by
It is routine to check that under our assumptions on the utility functions the correspondence cc=fo $ is well defined and satisfies the assumptions of the lemma [a similar verification is given in Gale and Sobel (1980) 
Uniqueness of efficient proportional distributions
The proof of uniqueness depends on an analysis of the necessary conditions for optimality.
Let X be an optimal proportional distribution.
Then there is a AE A such that x solves maxC~iSui(s,xi(s))Pi(s), subject to ~xi(s)=Z(s).
(1) This is a problem considered in Gale and Sobel (1980) and therefore we can assert that if X is a solution to (1) then there exists a function p satisfying, for almost every s and every i, 'i"l(s,xi(s) 
lPi(s)~B(s),
with equality if xi(s)> 0.
We can now prove the uniqueness' theorem.
'We say x=y if y({s:xi(s)#y,(s)})=O
for each i.
Theorem 2.' If u:(s,c) is a strictly decreasing function of c for all i then
there is at most one efficient proportional distribution associated with the shares 8,,. . .,lJ,.
Proof.
Suppose x and y are two efficient proportional distributions associated with the shares b' l,...,e, and that ~yi(s)pi(s)~~xi(s)pi(s) for all i. Then it follows from (1) and (2) 
In order to obtain a contradiction, suppose that x# y and let k be the smallest integer with y, #xk. It follows from (3) and the fact that xxi =I yi that yk sxk with strict unequality on a set of positive measure. As this contradicts s yk(~)~k(~)Z~~k(~)~L(~), the theorem is established. 1
Properties of proportional distributions
Suppose X is an efficient proportional distribution. In order to have appeal as an equitable outcome of the distribution process, X should have some additional properties. For example, if expectations are different it seems reasonable to expect that Jpixi > ei for each i. That is, each agent expects to receive more than his objective share. Unfortunately, this may not be the case in general. For example, in a two-agent, two-state world, with total income of one unit in each state, let agent one have probabilities (l/2,1/2) and utility function u1 (j, c)=jc for j = 1,2, and let agent two have probabilities (l/3,2/3) and u,(j, c) = c/j for j= 1,2. Then the unique proportional distribution with shares (l/2,1/2) is (0,6/7) for agent one and '1 am gratefpl to Hilton Machado for discovering an error in an earlier version of this proof.
(1,1/7) for agent two. Thus each agent expects to receive 3/7 of the total income. What makes the above example possible is a difference in tastes that more than compensates for different expectations. This possibility can be ruled out in two special cases: Observe that K 2 1 is equivalent to Jp&z ei for each i. Condition (A) implies that each agent is identical with respect to all characteristics except expectations.
This corresponds to a situation in which similar workers have different attitudes about the future. For condition (B) to hold all preferences must be independent of the state of nature. This situation may be interpreted as a gambling model where each agent has Ii dollars to bet and the xi(s) is the amount received by i in the event s. The result then guarantees that each agent has non-negative expected winnings (if Bi = Z,/x,Z, ).
Proof.
Suppose X is efficient. Then by (2) there exists a function /I satisfying, for almost every s,
nipi(S)~B(S)IUI(S,Xi(S)),
It follows that, for almost every s,
Suppose condition (A) holds. Integrating both sides of (5) and summing over i yields But, for fixed s, 
Combining
(6) and (7), and an application of (4) yield and soKz1.
To prove ( and so Kz 1, the desired result. 1
Some interpretation of the proof of condition (B) is possible. Notice that, roughly speaking, p,(s)uI(~~(s)) is a price system supporting 'the efficient allocation X. Then (8) says that the value of the income Xi is no more than the product of average prices (vi) and average income (0&Z) for every agent. Adding these inequalities yields the conclusion K 2 1. Also notice that the inequalities in (7) and (8) will hold strictly provided agents do not have identical expectations.
Hence, K> 1 in this case.
Proportional bets
In view of the results of the previous sections we can reformulate our model to describe a special case. Suppose that each agent i has a positive amount of money pi and a utility function vi satisfying our boundedness, smoothness and concavity assumptions, and depending on income alone. Then, provided the agents have different expectations, there will be an incentive to gamble.
Call a vector y= (yi, . . ., y,) of measurable functions from S to R a bet if yi(s)2 -pi and CT= I yi(s)=O.
By defining functions ui by ui(c) = U((C -pi), letting Z=cy= 1 pi, and e,=pJZ, we can apply the theorems of sections 3 and 4 to assert the existence and uniqueness of an efficient proportional distribution X=(X1,. . ., 2,). Furthermore, by Theorem 3(B) we have j Xi(s)pi(s)2 Bi and, letting ji(s)=xi(s) -/Ii, an efficient bet with the expected shares ljji/ei independent of i, and expected winnings non-negative for every agent. Dubins and Spanier (1961) discuss a model of division for the case in which all utility functions are linear, z+(s,c)=c, and Z(s)= 1 for all s. In this section we deduce one of their results as a consequence of our analysis. Proof: Let x be an efficient proportional distribution. For every non-empty subset T of (1,. . ., m} let S, = {s : xi(s) >O if and only if i E T}. Thus S, is the set of states for which each agent in subset T gets positive income and everyone not in T receives 0 income. Then for every T, S, can be partitioned into A,(T) with
Linear utility functions

